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THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN ACTIONS TO
SET ASIDE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND
IN ACTIONS AGAINST DIRECTORS BY
CREDITORS OF CORPORATIONS
SAMUEL M. HESSON
Introduction
The New York State Legislature has recently concerned itself with stat-
utes of limitation in actions brought by, or in behalf of corporations against
directors and officers.' It was thought that existing statutes prolonged the
possibility of suit to such an extent that directors and officers were preju-
diced by lapse of time in making their defense.2 A new Subdivision 8 was
added in 1942 to Civil Practice Act § 48 which prescribes a six-year statute
of limitations, as follows:
"8. An action, legal or equitable, by or on behalf of a corporation against
a director, officer or stockholder, or a former director, officer or stock-
holder, if such action is for an accounting, or to procure judgment on
the ground of fraud, or to recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed or to
enforce a liability created by common law or by statute unless such action
is one to recover damages for waste or for an injury to property or for
an accounting in connection therewith in which case such action shall
be subject to the provisions of subdivision seven of section forty-nine."
This enactment effects a shortening of the statute of limitations in actions
brought against directors and officers by a corporation itself or by stock-
holders in the corporation's right. The ten-year statute of limitations is in-
applicable to such actions, and, while the statute does not expressly say that
the fraud action is barred six years from the date of the fraud, the sponsors
of "the bill intended to abolish, as to corporate actions against directors and
officers, the rule that the time is measured from the date of discovery of the
fraud. Justification for such exceptional treatment was found in the fact
that modern regulation of corporations gives stockholders better oppor-
tunity to familiarize themselves with their corporation's affairs.
IN. Y. Civim PRACTiCE AcT §§ 48(8), 49(7).2 The time allowed was ten years, the normal equity statute of limitations, if the
action was properly brought in equity for an accounting. If the action was based upon
an injury to the corporation caused by negligence or other wrongful act, six years was
allowed. Where the action was based on fraud, the time was computed from the
discovery of the facts constituting the fraud. See Potter v. Walker, 276 N. Y. 15, 11
N. E. (2d) 335 (1937); Dunlop's Sons, Inc. v. Spurr, 285 N. Y. 333, 34 N. E. (2d)
344 (1941); Equity Corp. v. Groves, 294"N. Y. 8, 60 N. E. (2d) 19 (1945).
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This legislative action did not affect the existing rules which apply to
actions by creditors of corporations against directors and officers. There
are several New York statutes which give creditors a non-derivative right
of action, based upon negligence or other misconduct of corporate manage-
ment.3 When the creditor's right is sought to be enforced we must look else-
where than to Civil Practice Act, section 48, to discover the applicable
limitation of time.4
The injury for which the creditor seeks redress under the statutes men-
tioned above frequently involves a transfer of the corporation's assets. If
the transfer is fraudulent as to creditors the creditor has a remedy under
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.5 The statute of limitations as to
such a remedy is ten years measured from the date of the transfer.6 The rule
is the same whether the transferor is a natural person or a corporation. Cor-
poration laws, however, give the creditor of a corporation an additional
statutory remedy to which a different statute of limitations applies.
The determination of the number of years to be allowed for the com-
mencement of a particular action is of subordinate importance to the deter-
mination of the date from which the appointed time is to be measured. We
are here mainly concerned with the ascertainment of the date from which
the statutory period shall be computed. If limitations run from the date of
the transaction, the creditor's cause of action may be barred before he has
any reason to know of its existence. If, on the other hand, the date of dis-
covery of the fraud, or the date of judgment upon the primary obligation,
or the date of return of an execution, be taken as the starting point, transac-
tions of a date long past can be brought into the light of litigation. Directors
and officers of a corporation may then be subject to suit by creditors al-
though action by the corporation or by its stockholders has long since been
barred. There is some reason in this. Creditors should not be held bound
to exercise that degree of vigilance which is the duty of stockholders in dis-
covering the misconduct of directors in the management of a corporation.
The directors have little cause for complaint when they are compelled, at
any time, to restore, for the benefit of creditors of the corporation, assets
which they have fraudulently acquired for themselves. When, however, the
3N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAw §§ 15, 58, 59, 61, 114; N. Y. GENERAL CORP. LAW §§ 60, 61.4See Shepard Co. v. Taylor Publishing Co., 234 N. Y. 465, 135 N. E. 852 (1923),
holding the creditor's action under N. Y. STOCK COR'. LAW § 15 to be upon a liability
created by statute, to which a six year limitation, computed from date of return of exe-
cution against the corporation, applies.
GN. Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAw art. 10.6Buttles v. Smith, 281 N. Y. 226, 22 N. E. (2d) 350 (1939).
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directors have not themselves acquired any benefit, when the sole conse-
quence of their misconduct is loss to the corporation, a shorter period of
time for the commencement of a creditor's action may well be justified.
This article embraces an inquiry into the statute of limitations applicable
to actions to set aside fraudulent conveyances under the Debtor and Creditor
Law and that applicable to actions by creditors, to reach assets of a corpora-
tion transferred in violation of corporation laws. It extends also to a con-
sideration of the statute of limitations in the creditor's action based upon
the misconduct of directors and officers of a corporation.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
A. The New York Rule
Neither Article 2 of the Civil Practice Act nor the Debtor and Creditor
Law expressly prescribes the period of time within which an action may
be brought to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. Prior to the adoption of
the Civil Practice Act, the action was held to be within the fifth subdivision
of section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure which prescribed a six-year
statute of limitations for:
"An action to procure a judgment, other than for a sum of money, on
the ground of fraud, in a case which on the thirty first day of Decem-
ber, eighteen hundred and forty-six, was cognizable by the court of
chancery. The cause of action, in such a case, is not deemed to have
accrued, until the discovery, by the plaintiff, or the person under whom
he claims, of the facts constituting the fraud."
The statute of limitations did not start to run upon the discovery of the
fraud, however, unless judgment had been procured and execution returned
unsatisfied. In Gates v. Andrews7 the fraudulent transfer had been discov-
ered more than six years before the commencement of the action but the
statute was held to be no bar for the reason that the cause of action was
not perfect until the creditor had a right to sue. The question arose again
in Weaver v. Haviland and a like decision was rendered, the court saying:
"The right of Fish to bring an action to set aside the transfer did not
accrue until he had recovered a judgment in this state against Phebe
Haviland and the return of an execution unsatisfied. Until his claim
against Phebe Haviland had ripened into a judgment he stood as a gen-
eral creditor merely and was not in a situation to assail the transfer
to defendant. The authorities upon this point are numerous and decisive
[citations omitted]. The time when the fraud was committed is not
the period from which the limitation is to be computed, but the time
737 N. Y. 657 (1868).
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when the plaintiff had acquired a standing to assail it. The present
action was commenced within six years after Fish had recovered his
judgment here.... The clause in sub. 5, sec. 382, following the clause
above quoted, 'the cause of action in such a case is not deemed to have
accrued until the discoyery by the plaintiff or the person under which he
claims of the facts constituting the fraud' does not hellp the defendant.
This clause was added to enlarge the time for bringing the action be-
yond the six years in the case specified. It was not intended to make the
date of the discovery of the fraud the time of the accruing of the right
of action in cases where the fraud was known, but the plaintiff had not
established his claim by judgment. The clause was inserted to provide
for a class of cases where the right of action was perfect but the fraud
had not been discovered until a subsequent period."8
And the statute did not commence to run upon the return of the execution
unless the fraud was then discovered. It was so held in Decker v. Decker
wherein it was urged upon the court that the action was in substance one
for the enforcement of a trust to which the ten-year statute applied. The
court said:
"The transfer to Jackson could therefore be assailed only on the ground
of fraud, and a creditor's bill to reach and follow the proceeds of
the fraud in the hands of fraudulent beneficiaries was a proper and
suitable remedy, and, I think, might have been chosen even if a trust
had resulted. There would have been a choice of remedies. The action,
therefore, was founded on fraud and came within section 382 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. It was only barred by the lapse of six years
from the discovery of the fraud. . .."
A cause of action to recover damages for fraud was not within section
382, subdivision 5, of the Code of Civil Procedure, above referred to.10 The
section applied only to actions equitable in nature. Upon the adoption of
the Civil Practice Act, however, the words "other than fpr a sum of money"
were omitted from the section and actions in deceit were thereby brought
within its operation.:"
It is important to note that the section prescribing a statute of limita-
tions for an action to procure a judgment on the ground of fraud was limited
to actions based on actual fraud, deliberate and intentional.1 2 It did not apply
to actions based upon constructive fraud.' 3 If the transaction was consid-
8142 N. Y. 534, 537, 37 N. E. 641, 642 (1894).
9108 N. Y. 128, 136, 15 N. E. 307, 308 (1888).
'OMiller v. Wood, 116 N. Y. 351, 22 N. E. 553 (1889).
l1Lavs of New York 1921, c. 199, § 1.
12Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano, 283 N. Y. 139, 27 N. E. (2d) 814 (1940).
13Pitcher v. Sutton, 238 App. Div. 291, 264 N. Y. Supp. 488 (4th Dep't 1933), aff'd
264 N. Y. 638 (1934).
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ered unlawful and invalid because of the abuse of a relation, or by reason
of a statute, even if there was no actual intention to cheat or defraud, the
ten-year statute of limitations governing equity actions applied and the ac-
crual of the cause of action was not deemed to be postponed until the facts
were discovered. 1 4 This is the rule which is now applied to actions brought
to set aside fraudulent conveyances. 15
The departure from the rule of Gates v. Andrews and Weaver v. Haviland
was the result of the adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.1 6
Prior thereto a creditor could not assail a fraudulent transfer until he had
reduced his claim to judgment, and, except in extraordinary circumstances,
until execution upon the judgment had been returned unsatisfied. 17 The
procurement of a judgment is no longer a condition precedent, however,
and a general creditor, even if his claim has not matured, may have a fraudu-
lent conveyance set aside.18 Gates v. Andrews and Weaver v. Haviland ap-
plied the rule that limitations do not start to run until complainant has the
right to sue. The application of that same rule requires that the statute of
limitations shall begin to run at the date of the conveyance since the creditor
now has the right to commence his action at that time. Exception to the
rule is possible only if the action is held to be within the fraud statute of
limitations.
The Debtor and Creditor Law, section 276, declares that a conveyance
made with actual intent, as distinguished from intent implied in law, to
hinder, delay or defraud either present or future creditors is fraudulent
as to both present and future creditors. It is seldom necessary, however,
for the creditor to assume the burden of proving actual fraud. Section 273
of the statute provides that a conveyance by a person who is or will be
thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent' as to creditors without regard to
the transferor's intent if made without a fair consideration. The actual
intent of the trahisferor is immaterial also as to certain conveyances made
without fair consideration by persons engaged or intending to engage in
business.' 9 In the ordinary case the creditor will secure redress upon proof
of facts giving rise to a legal presumption of fraud. Since his claim then
rests upon constructive, as distinguished from actual fraud, the ten-year
14Ibid.
15 Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano, 283 N. Y. 139, 27 N. E. (2d) 814 (1940).
16It was adopted in New York by Laws of New York 1925, c. 254, § 5.
'
1 Weaver v. Haviland, 142 N. Y. 534, 37 N. E. (2d) 641 (1894).
18N. Y. DEBTOR AND CREDIToR LAW §§ 278, 279.
'ON. Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW § 274.
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statute of limitations applies, and the cause of action accrues at the date of
the conveyance. The cause of action in Buttles v. Smith was based upon section
274 of the Debtor and Creditor Law, and the actual intent of the parties
was, therefore, of no moment. The court said:
"As to the causes of action set up under article 10 of the Debtor and
'Creditor Law, different rules apply. Under that statute it is not essen-
tial that the creditor first procure judgment and the return of an un-
satisfied execution before he may maintain the action (American Surety
Co. v. Conmwr, 251 N. Y. 1). The statute is remedial and he might sue
individually before or after the maturity of his claim to set aside the
transfer. . . . His time to sue should not be extended by the proceed-
ings to obtain judgment thereon and subsequent sequestration of assets.
The complaint sets up constructive fraud, not actual fraud, and under
such conditions the ten-year Statute of Limitations applies and com-
mences to run from the date when the act or omission constituting it
occurred and not from the time when the facts constituting the fraud
were discovered .... -20
The opinion does not intimate that the creditor would have been denied the
benefits of the discovery rule if his complaint had been based upon actual
fraud. As a matter of pleading the creditor will generally assert that the
conveyance was tainted by a dishonest purpose, even though his main re-
liance is upon constructive, fraud. A complaint of that character was before
the court in Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jana. It was construed as stating a cause
of action for constructive fraud, the court saying:
"The complaint in the case at bar states a cause of action to set aside
a transfer which, regardless of the intent of the debtor, is forbidden by
the statute to the extent that there are claims by creditors. In this case
the complaint does not rest upon the facts that the transfers were with-
out consideration and rendered the debtor insolvent, but also alleges an
actual intent on the part of the debtor to evade the creditor. The com-
plaint would have been sufficient without such additional allegation.
But the gravamen of the complaint is not thereby transformed into an
action to recover judgment on the ground of actual fraud. Surely the
action is not one for actual fraud where a complete cause of action
may be stated by a showing of the bare facts of a voluntary convey-
ance resulting in insolvency. Such a conveyance is but one of the two
kinds which are deemed fraudulent by the operation of the statute.
Both kinds are simply acts which are voidable at the behest of the
creditor as a result of the statutory declaration. . . . The plaintiff's
right is complete without reference to the quality or character of the
acts of the individual defendants. The gravamen of the action is the
20281 N. Y. 226, 236, 22 N. E. (2d) 350, 353 (1939).
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right of the creditor to be paid out of assets to which he is actually
entitled and to set aside the indicia of ownership which apparently con-
tradict that right."'2 '
This construction of the pleading saved the complaint as against de-
fendant's defense based upon section 48, subdivision 5 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act, since the fraud had been discovered more than six years before the
action was commenced. In Werbelovsky v. Rosen,22 the pleading was simi-
larly construed and, ten years having elapsed from the date of the transfers,
the defense of the statute of limitations was sustained. The decision is in
accord with the New York rule that neither ignorance, on the part of the
plaintiff, of the existence of the cause of action, nor concealment of its ex-
istence by the defendant, will prevent the running of the statute of limi-
tations.23
Even if the remedies afforded the creditor 'by the Debtor and Creditor
Law are barred by lapse of time, a remedy remains if the transfer involved
actual fraud. The creditor, within six years after his discovery of the facts,
may sue for damages sustained by reason of the transfer made with intent
to cheat. In Nasaba Corp. v. Harf red Realty Corp., the plaintiff had pro-
cured judgments against two corporations, and executions had been returned
unsatisfied in 1931. The assets of the corporations had been transferred, by
certain manipulations in 1929, to the controlling director and stockholder and
to his wife. The creditor did not discover the facts until 1940, more than
ten years after the date of the transfers. He then promptly sued, his com-
plaint alleging that the transactions were "for unfair insufficient and inade-
quate considerations with intent to and as part of a concerted plan and
conspiracy to hinder delay and defraud plaintiff creditor of its claims." The
only relief demanded was for the damages sustained. A motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by limita-
tions was denied. The reason, in the court's words, was:
"The allegations contained in the complaint . . . quite clearly show that
the action is not to set aside or to declare the conveyances of the debtor's
properties fraudulent nor to procure application of the real properties
conveyed to the payment of the judgments, nor is equitable relief of
any kind sought. Plaintiff does not seek to follow the funds and prop-
erty of the debtor corporation into the hands of any of the defendants.
Thus if an analysis of the complaint establishes that causes of action
for actual fraud are alleged, it was error to dismiss the complaint."' '
21283 N. Y. 139, 142, 27 N. E. (2d) 814, 816 (1940).
22260 App. Div. 222, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 88 (2d Dep't 1940).
23Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., 276 N. Y. 259, 11 N. E. (2d) 902 (1938); Exkorn
v. Exkorn, 1 App. Div. 124, 37 N. Y. Supp. 68 (1st Dep't 1896)
24287 N. Y. 290, 294, 39 N. E. (2d) 243, 245 (1942).
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The opinion in Nasaba Corp. v. Harfred Realty Corp. would seem to indi-
cate that the relief demanded, rather than the presence in the complaint of
allegations of fraud, is the determining factor on the question of the ap-
plicability of the fraud statute of limitations to transactions involving fraudu-
lent transfers. If the complaint had been for equitable relief, the court would
probably have followed Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano and treated the allega-
tions of fraud as surplusage.2 5 The language of the court in Buttles v. Smith
will bear a contrary meaning. It was there said:
"The complaint sets up constructive fraud, not actual fraud, and under
such conditions the ten year Statute of Limitations applies .... Above
it appears that the right to recover was fundamentally and necessarily
cognizable in equity and not at law. Section 53 of the Civil Practice Act
applies to all actions in equity for fraud not covered by subdivision 5
of section 48."26
Nevertheless, in the Nasaba case, citing Buttles v. Smith and Hearn 45 St.
Corp. v. Jano, this language was used:
"If it appears from the face of the complaint that the causes of action
alleged owe their existence exclusively to statutory provisions (Debtor
& Creditor Law, Art. 10) . . . or to constructive fraud as distinguished
from actual fraud, applicable statutes of limitation . . . bar prose-
cution." 27
There was no attempt to make distinction between actions to set aside
fraudulent transfers under Debtor and Creditor Law, section 273, and like
actions prosecuted under section 276 wherein the burden rests on the creditor
to show actual fraud. Nor does there seem to be any sound reason why the
creditor should have a longer time to sue in the one case than in the other.
The result to him in either case is the same. The recovery he seeks is "to
levy in satisfaction of his debt upon property which he is entitled to treat
as belonging to the debtor, albeit the title is ostensibly lodged elsewhere.
28
B. .Fraudulent Conveyances-Comparative Rules
There is but little support in judicial opinion elsewhere for the New York
rule that the date'of the transfer is the starting point in computing the statute
of limitations in actions to set aside fraudulent transfers. In a few states,
however, there are statutes which demand as much diligence of the creditor.
25Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx Co., 276 N. Y. 259, 11 N. E. (2d) 902 (1938) (Action
on a contract for royalties. Allegations of fraud in accounting to plaintiff held
not to change the cause of action to one for relief on the ground of fraud).
26281 N. Y. 226, 236, 22 N. E. (2d) 350, 353 (1939).
27287 N. Y. 290, 293, 39 N. E. '(2d) 243, 244 (1942).
2SHearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano, 283 N. Y. 139, 142, 27 N. E. (2d) 814, 816 (1940).
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In Tennessee it is provided29 that limitations shall not commence to run in
favor of a fraudulent or voluntary possessor until the creditor has a right of
action to test the validity of the conveyance, and in that state any creditor
without having a judgment may sue to set aside a fraudulent conveyance.30
It was held in Ramsey v. Quille.31 that, since the creditor could sue without
a judgment, his attack upon a fraudulent conveyance was barred by seven
years adverse possession by a wife occupying with her husband under a
recorded deed from him. This view is exceptional, however, and even in
those states which have adopted the Uniform'Fraudulent Conveyance Act,8 2
the courts have adhered to previously established rules as to the date of
accrual of the action. Usually the opinions do lot mention the effect, on
the limitations question, of the adoption of the Act, but in Lind v. 0. N. John-
son Co.,3 the question was fully considered, and the court overruled the
contention that the statute had effected a change in the rule that limitations
commence to run when the creditor's judgment is procured.
In Kenstucky the action to set aside the fraudulent conveyance is consid-
ered to be. within the general fraud statute of limitations,3 4 accruing upon
discovery of the fraud, but the practical effect of the New York rule is,
nevertheless, achieved. The statute3 5 prescribes a five-year limitation for
2 9 TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 10363 provides: "In no case shall the limi-
tation of actions be held to commence running in favor of a fraudulent or voluntary
possession until the creditor to be affected by the fraudulent or voluntary conveyance
has a right of action to test the validity of such conveyance."3 0 TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 10358.
315 Lea 184 (Tenn. 1880).3 2 Aaiz. CODE ANN. (1939) §§ 58-401 et seq.; CA. Crv. CODE (1939 §§ 3439.01 et seq.;
R.v. CODE DEL. (1935) §§ 6059 et seq.; MD. ANN. CODE (Flack, 1939) art. 39B, §§ 1
et seq.; MAss. ANN. LAws (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 109A, §§ 1 et seq.; MIcyr. ComP.
LAWS (Henderson, 1937) §§ 26.811 et seq.; MINN. STAT. (1945) §§ 513.20 et seq.;
Laws of Mont. 1945, c. 126; Nav. Comp. LAws (Supp. 1941) §§ 1566 et seq.; N. H.
REv. LAws (1942) c. 149, §§ et seq.; N. J. STAT ANN. (1939) 25:2-7 et seq.; N. Y.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW art 10; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1930) tit 39, § 351 et seq.;
S. D. CODE (1939) §§ 23.0201 et seq.; TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) §§ 7271
et seq.; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) §§ 33-1-1 et seq.; Wis. STAT. (1941) §§ 242.01 et seq.;
Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) §§ 48-101 et seq.
33204 Minn. 30, 282 N. W. 661, 119 A. L. R. 940, 949 (1938).34Gillardi v. Henry, 272 Ky. 188, 113 S. W. (2d) 1158 (1938) ; Moore v. Sheperd,
189 Ky. 593, 225 S. W. 484 (1920); Grand Lodge v. First Nat. 'Bank, 251 Ky. 189,
64 S. W. (2d) 474 (1933)'; Pope vr. Cawood, 293 Ky. 660, 170 S. W. (2d) 55 (1943) ;
Sword v. Scott, 293 Ky. 630, 169 S. W. (2d) 825 (1943) ; Hollifield v. Blackburn,
294 Ky. 74, 170 S. W. (2d) 910 (1943) (the recording of the fraudulent deed starts statute
of limitations running).
SSKy. REv. STAT. (Cullen, 1944) §§ 413.120, 413.130. The third subdivision of §
413.130 provides: "In an action for relief or damages for fraud ... the cause of action
shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud or mistake. How-
ever, the action shall be commenced within ten years after the time of making the
contract or the perpetration of the fraud."
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actions brought for relief on the ground of fraud, and provides that the
action is deemed to have accrued upon the discovery of the fraud. It pro-
vides further that the action must be commenced within ten years after
the perpetration of the fraud. No distinction is made between actual and
constructive fraud.36 In either case the action is barred by the lapse of ten
years from the date of the transfer, and may be earlier barred by the ex-
piration of five years after the discovery of the fraud.37 The Missouri
fraud statute of limitations is in somewhat similar terms, but it is held in-
applicable to actions to set aside fraudulent conveyances. 8a
By statute in Virginia3 0 and West Virginia0 distinction is made between
cases involving constructive and those involving actual fraud. The statutes
refer to voluntary transfers only, and prescribe a five-year limitation for
actions brought to set them aside. In Virginia the action must be brought
within five years after recordation of the deed, or within five years after
the transfer was or should have been discovered if the instrument was not
recorded. In West Virginia suit must be commenced within five years after
the transfer was made. The statutes are held to have no application to cases
of actual fraud.41 In Atkinson v. Solenberger a conveyance from husband to
wife had been recorded almost nine years before the creditor's suit was
36Grand Lodge v. First Nat. Bank, 251 Ky. 189, 64 S. W. (2d) 474 (1933).3 7Dorsey v. Phillips, 84 Ky. 420, 1 S. W. 667 (1886); Phillips v. Shipp, 81 Ky.
436, 5 Ky. L. Rep. 460 (1885), and cases cited supra note 34.38SRogers v. Brown, 61 Mo. 187 (1875); Miller v. Allen, 192 S. W. 967 (Mo. 1917);
Bobb v. Woodward, 50 Mo. 95 (1872). The statute, Mo. Rav. STAT. AN. (1942) § 1014,
prescribes a five-year limitation for "an action for relief on the ground of fraud, the
cause of action in such case to be deemed not to have accrued until the discovery by the
aggrieved party, at any time within ten years, of the facts constituting the fraud."
3 9 VA. CODE AN. (1942) § 5820. "Limitation of suits to avoid voluntary deeds, etc.,
-No gift, conveyance, assignment, transfer, or charge, which is not on consideration
deemed valuable in law, or which is upon consideration of marriage, shall be avoided in
whole or in part for that cause only, unless within five years from its recordation,
if recorded under a law providing for its recordation, and if not so recorded within five
years from the time the same was or should have been discovered, suit be brought for
that purpose, or the subject thereof, or some part of it, be distrained or levied on by
or at the suit of a creditor, as to whom such gift, conveyance, assignment, transfer, or
charge, is declared to be void by section fifty-one hundred and eighty-five."
40W. VA. CODE AN. (1943) § 3988. 'Limitation of Suits to Avoid Voluntary Trans-
fers or Charges.-No transfer or charge which is not on consideration deemed valuable
in law" shall be avoided, either in whole or in part, for that cause only, unless, within
five years after it is made, suit be brought for that purpose, or the subject thereof, or
some part of it, be distrained or levied on by or at the suit of a creditor as to whom
such transfer or charge is declared to be voided by the next preceding section. .. ."4 1Bumgardner v. Harris, 92 Va. 188, 23 S. E. 229 (1895) ; Welsh v. Solenberger, 85
Va. 441, 8 S. E. 91 (1888): Hunter v. Hunter, 10 W. Va. 321 (1877); Himan v.
Thorne, 32 W. Va. 507, 9 S. E. 930 (1889) ; McCue v. McCue, 41 W. Va. 151, 23 S. E.
689 (1895) ; Solins v. White, - W. Va. -, 36 S. E. (2d) 132 (1945).
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begun. The complaint alleged that not only was the deed voluntary, but
also that it was made for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defraud-
ing creditors and that the grantee had notice of the fraudulent intent.
Holding the statute as to voluntary transfers inapplicable, the court said:
"This is not a case where money or property is received from an in-
solvent donor by one who has no reason to suspect such insolvency and
without any purpose to defraud the creditors of the donor. In such a
case the transfer being merely voluntary, it is as to the donee construc-
tively fraudulent and must be attacked within five years, but where the
donee has knowledge of the fact that the donor is insolvent and the
natural and necessary effect of the transactions is to hinder, delay, or
defraud the donor's creditors, it is actually fraudulent, not only as to
the donor but also as to the donee."4'
The five-year statute does apply, however, if thd fraudulent design of the
grantor is unknown to the grantee. 43 In cases of actual fraud, held not to
be within the statute, there is no statute of limitations, and the defendant
must rely upon the doctrine of laches to defeat the creditor's suit.
44
A Maryland statute45 requires exceptional vigilance on the part of credi-
tors when the fraudulent transfer is between husband and wife. Such a
transfer is invalid if made in prejudice of the rights of subsisting creditors,
but the creditors must assert their claims within three years after the ac-
quisition of the property or be forever barred. For the purpose of assert-
ing the creditors' claims unmatured claims are considered as due and ma-
tured. The courts construe the statute as requiring action by, the creditor
within three years after date of recording the deed, or after the creditor had
notice of it, or some knowledge which put him on inquiry.
4 6
42112 Va. 667, 671, 72 S. E. 727, 728 (1911).
43Hawkins v. Blake, 69 W. Va. 190, 71 S. E. 191 (1911) ; Sleeth v. Taylor, 82 W. Va.
139,.95 S. E. 597 (1918).44Bumgardner v. Harris, 92 Va. 188, 23 S. E. 229 (1895) ; Atkinson v. Solengerger,
112 Va. 667, 72 S. E. 727 (1911) ; Temple v. Jones, Son & Co., 179 Va. 286, 19 S. E.
(2d) 57 (1942); Mitchell v. Cornell, 88 W. Va. 194, 106 S. E. 866 (1921); Bank of
Marlinton v. McLaughlin, 123 W. Va. 608, 17 S. E. (2d) 213 (1941).4 5MD. Alx. CoDE (Flack, 1939) art. 45, § 1. "The property, real and personal, be-
longing to a woman at the time of her marriage, and all the property which she may
acquire or receive after her marriage, by purchase, gift, grant, devise, bequest, descent,
in the course of, distribution, by her own skill, labor or personal exertions, or in any
other manner, shall be protected from the debts of the husband, and not in any way
be liable for the payment thereof; provided, that no acquisition of property passing from
one spouse to the other, shall be valid if the same has been made or granted in prejudice
of the rights of subsisting creditors, who, however, must assert their claims within
three years after the acquisition of the property, or be absolutely barred, and, for the
purpose of asserting their rights under this section, claims of creditors not yet due and
matured shall be considered as due and matured."4 6Davis v. Harris, 170 Md. 610, 185 AtI. 469 (1936); Stieff Co. v. Ullrich, 110 Md.
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Statutes in Kansas47 and Indiana#5 provide a short statute of limitations as
to claims to lands fraudulently conveyed where the grantor has died. In
Kansas the limitation is two, in Indiana five years measured from the date
of the grantor's death.
In addition to the jurisdictions which have by statute accorded the trans-
ferees of property the benefit of a statute of limitations measured, in certain
circumstances, from the date of the transaction, there are a few states in
which the courts sometimes reach a similar result by decision. While ad-
hering to the rule that the cause of action does not accrue until the facts
constituting the fraud are discovered, they hold the creditor to have dis-
covered the fraud as of the date of recordation of the conveyance.49 The
recorded conveyance is deemed to be constructive notice not only of the
deed and its contents but also of the fraud. The cases depend upon their
own facts, and the recorded deed is sometimes held to be constructive notice
of the fraud by courts which are bound by the rule that the effect of re-
cording is to give notice only of the deed and its contents. 0 In Causenmker v.
De Roo,51 it appeared that interest on a note due in 1926 bad been paid to
629, 73 AtI. 874 (1909); U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Shoul, 161 Md. 425, 157 At. 717(1931) ; Dixon v. Dixon, 128 Md. 1, 96 At. 1027 (1916); Wear v. Skinner, 46 Md.
257 (1876). (Where deed recorded, the statute is conclusive for ordinary diligence
would induce creditor to look at the records).
47KAN. GEN. STAT. (Corrick, 1935) § 59-141. "Real estate subject to sale includes
fraudulent transfers; innocent purchasers; limitation .... Provided . . . and no claim
to the lands so fraudulently conveyed shall be made, unless within two years next after
the decease of the grantor." Prior to L. 1939, Ch. 180, § 280 the limitation was three
years.
48IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 6-1109; Todd v. Eberwine, 216 Ind. 47, 22 N. E.
(2d) 977 (1939) (the time to sue is not extended by the statute if limitations had run
prior to grantor's death).
49E. B. Piekenbrock & Sons v. Knoer, 136 Iowa 534, 114 N. W. 200 (1907) (Deed
recorded immediately and husband and wife went into possession-creditor lived in same
community) ; Bristow v. Lange, 221 Iowa 904, 266 N. W. 808 (1936) (failure to get
lien on lind within five years after deed recorded is, in absence of special circumstances,
a bar). To same effect: Somers v. Spaulding, 229 Iowa 432, 294 N. W. 610, 133 A. L. R.
1300, 1311 (1940) ; Kittel v. Smith, 136 Kan. 522, 16 P. (2d) 538 (1932) ; Black v.
Black, 64 Kan. 689, 68 Pac. 662 (1902) ; Fleming v. Grafton, 54 Miss. 79 (1876). (Cf.
Gordon v. Anderson, 90 Miss. 677, 44 So. 67 (1907) holding the fact of record merely
a circumstance in connection with change of possession) ; Hughes v. Littrell, 75 Mo. 573
(1882); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Wilson, 193 N. C. 836, 137 S: E. 135 (1927)
(Action more than three years after registration of the deed held barred. The opinion
says, however, that the creditor knew of the deed more than three years before action
commenced). Cf. Ewbank v. Lyman, 170 N. C. 505, 87 S. E. 348 (1915) (saying the
record is not usually notice of the fraud) ; Vodrie v. Tynan, 57 S. W. 680 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1900). Cf. Watkins Co. v. Gibbs, 66 S. W. (2d) 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933)
(holding recordation constructive notice at least where plaintiff did not try to prove
that he did not know of the recorded conveyance).
5 0See note 49 supra.
51153 Kan. 648, 113 P. (2d) 85 (1941).
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1936. Judgment on the note was obtained in 1939. A month later the creditor
commenced action to set aside a deed from the debtors to their son of certain
land situate in a state other than that in which the creditor and the debtors
lived. The deed, reciting a consideration of one dollar had been recorded in
1936. The statute of limitations of Kansas was two years from the dis-
covery of the fraud, the cause, however, not accruing until entry of judg-
ment and return of execution. The cause of action was held barred. The
court said that ordinarily the fact of recordation was notice only of the
deed and its contents and not of the fraudulent purpose. If, however, the cir-
cumstances are such as to put a person of ordinary prudence upon inquiry,
the record is notice of the fraudulent intent.52 A like decision was rendered
in Smith v. Edwards,53 wherein the deed recited a consideration of "one
dollar and other valuable considerations," the court saying that if the deed
indicates a fair consideration all persons may rely upon it. To the same effect
is Bristow v. Lange5 4 in which a deed from father to son was assailed eight
years after it was recorded. The plaintiff was held barred by laches for
having delayed in sing upon a note which had matured eight years before.'
The cases holding that a recorded deed is constructive notice of the under-
lying fraudulent purpose are opposed to the great weight of authority. The
view is generally taken that recordation gives constructive notice only of
the deed and its contents, or that the fact of recordation is merely one cir-
cumstance to be considered with all others on the question as to whether
the creditor should have discovered the fraud at any particular point in
time.55
U2The circumstances, in this case sufficient, were as follows: the creditor could have
demanded payment of the note at any time; the deed showed it was to grantor's son
and recited only a nominal consideration; the grantors were practically insolvent; and
plaintiff claims that he lent the money only because the borrowers owned the property
involved in the litigation.
5381 Utah 244, 17 P. (2d) 264 (1932).
54221 Iowa 904, 266 N. W. 808 (1936).55Baldwin & Co. v. Williams, 74 Ark. 316, 86 S. W. 423 (1905) ; First Presbyterian
Church v. Rabbitt, 118 F. (2d) 732 (C. C. A. 9th, 1940); Rose v. Dunklee, 12 Colo.
App. 403, 56 Pac. 342 (1899) ; compare Underwood v. Fosha, 96 Kan. 549, 152 Pac. 638
(1915) with Kansas cases cited supra note 49; Chinn v. Curtis, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1563,
71 S. W. 923 (1903); Lant v. Manley, 75 Fed. 627 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896); Duxbury v.
Boice, 70 Minn. 113, 72 N. W.- 838 (1897) ; Oldham v. Wright, 337 Mo. 170, 85 S. W.
(2d) 483 (1935); compare Forsyth v. Easterday, 63 Neb. 887, 89 N. W. 407 (1902)
with State Bank v. Frey, 91 N. W. 239 (Neb. 1902), where grantee went into possession;
Stivens v. Summers, 68 Ohio St. 421, 67 N. E. 884 (1903) ; Goldbold v. Lambert, 8 Rich.
Eq. 155, 70 Am. Dec. 192 (S. C. 1856) ; Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin, 121 W. Va.
41, 1 S. E. (2d) 251 (1939) ; Schoedel v. State Bank, 245 Wis. 74, 13 N. W. (2d) 534
(1944) (as far as limitations are concerned there is no such thing as constructive dis-
covery of fraud).
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The rule of Weaver v. Havilavd,56 which prevailed in New York prior to
the adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, is the rule which
prevails generally throughout the United States today.57 A cause of action
86See note 8 .rpra.
WAria. Molina v. Bennett, 37 Ariz. 70, 289 Pac. 512 (1930) (3 years after discovery
of the fraud).
Cal. Adams v. Bell, 5 Cal. (2d) 697, 56 P. (2d) 208 (1936) ; Brown v. Campbell,
100 Cal. 635, 35 Pac. 433 (1893) ; First Presbyterian Church v. Rabbitt, 118 F. (2d) 732
(C. C. A. 9th, 1940). It is uncertain what effect the adoption in California of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act will have. Brunvold v. Johnson & Co., 59 Cal.
App. (2d) 75, 138 P. (2d) 32 (1943). Cf. The creditor's remedy where he purchases
the property at execution sale and sues to remove the fraudulent deed as a cloud on title.
In Scholle v. Finnell, 166 Cal. 546, 137 Pac. 241 (1913), it was held that the
creditor may wait until the last day to sue on his debt, and, after obtaining judgment,
wait for expiration of the period for issuing execution, and, upon buying the property
at the execution sale, wait almost five years before suing to set aside the convey-
ance. To the same effect: Puccetti v. Girola, 63 Cal. App. (2d) 240, 146 P. (2d)
714 (1944), holding that the cause of action did not accrue prior to the execution
sale and the fact that the cloud on title had its inception in fraud did not render ap-
plicable the three year statute relating to actions for relief on the ground of fraud.
Colo. Bowman v. May, 102 Colo. 417, 80 P. (2d) 327 (1938); Arnett v. Coffey, 5
Colo. App. 560, 39 Pac. 894 (1895); (within three years after discovery of fraud).
But the creditor cannot sue and cause does not accrue until judgment obtained. Rose
v. Dunklee, 12 Colo. App. 403, 56 Pac. 342 (1899). If the creditor unduly delays get-
ting judgment he will be barred by laches. Fox v. Lipe, 14 Colo. App. 258, 59 Pac.
850 (1900) (10 years delay in getting judgment and this action delayed until debtor
died--defense of laches sustained).
Fla. Lamper v. Osius, 38 F. Supp. 373 (S. D. Fla. 1941) Cf. Isaacs v. Mulray, 112
Fla. 197, 199, 150 So. 232, 233 (1933), holding that the cause does not accrue "until
suit has been filed at law to enforce the payment of the debt or until judgment is
recovered and even then if it be alleged ... that the property ... is held in trust for
the judgment debtor, it may be that the suit . . . might be considered as process in
aid of the enforcement of judgment which can be invoked at any time pending the life
of the judgment." The action may be barred by laches: Thresher v. Ocala Mfg.
Co., 153 Fla. 488, 15 So. (2d) 32 (19-43). (Deed recorded 1922-judgment in
1929-no attack on transfer until 1942 three years after grantor's death). Cf.
Sample v. Natalby, 120 Fla. 161, 162 So. 493 (1935), holding defense of laches
insufficient although six years elapsed from date of transfer, where no prejudice shown.
d. State v. Osborn, 143 Ind. 671, 42 N. E. 921 (1895) ; Duncan v. Cravens, 55 Ind.
525 (1877); DeArmond v. Ballou, 122 Ind. 398, 23 N. E. 766 (1889); Todd v. Eber-
wine, 216 Ind. 47, 22 N. E. (2d) 977 (1939). The statute is not suspended until dis-
covery, however, unless defendant is guilty of active concealment. Ibid.
Ky. See cases cited supra note 34. The action, however, is not maintainable after
the expiration of ten years from the perpetration of the fraud. Ibid.
Miss. Gordon v. Anderson, 90 Miss. 677, 44 So. 67 (1907). But see Abbey v. Com-
mercial Bank, 31 Miss. 434, 437 (1856), holding that a court of equity "could never
sanction the defense of Statute of Limitations at the instance of the defendant, and
his wife and child, the parties to the alleged fraud." In this case there was no ad-
verse possession, since the debtor remained in possession with his family.
Mont. Finch v. Kent, 24 Mont. 268, 61 Pac. 653 (1900) (within two years after
fraud discovered, but cause does not accrue until judgment obtained).
Neb. Ainsworth v. Roubal, 74 Neb. 723, 105 N. W. 248 (1905) (within four years
after fraud discovered providing judgment obtained, overruling Gillespie v. Cooper,
36 Neb. 775, 55 N. W. 302 (1893), which held the cause accrued upon discovery of
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to set aside a fraudulent conveyance is, by the weight of authority, within
the general fraud statute of limitations. The statutes ordinarily provide that
a cause of action to procure relief on the ground of fraud is deemed to have
accrued upon the discovery of the fraud, or upon.the discovery of the facts
constituting the fraud. There are exceptions, as in Indiana, where the
statute of limitations is not suspended in the absence of active concealment
by the defendant of the existence of the cause of action.58 The creditor
the fraud whether claim reduced to judgment or not) ; Buckner v. McHugh, 123 Neb.
396, 243 N. W. 119 (1932). The cause may be defeated by laches. Blum v. Voss,
139 Neb. 233, 297 N. W. 84 (1941) (the grantee had discharged a mortgage).
N. J. Levy v. D'Alesandro, 14 N. J. Misc. 449, 185 A. 543 (Ch. 1936). (In equity
the period of limitations begins to run only from the discovery of the fraud by the
injured party, or from the time when he was in a situation where, by the exercise of
reasonable diligence, he would have discovered the fraud). Cf. Silverman v. Christian,
123 N. J. Eq. 506, 198 Atl. 832 (Ch. 1938) (Here the debt fell due from the prin-
cipal debtor on Jan. 23, 1931, more than six years before the commencement of this
suit. Thereupon, and when the fraudulent conveyance was made, the six year period
began to run).
N. C. Ewbank v. Lyman, 170 N. C. 505, 87 S. E. 348 (1915); Graeber v. Sides,
151 N. C. 596, 66 S. E. 600 (1909)
Ohio. Stivens v. Summers, 68 Ohio St. 421, 67 N. E. 884 (1903) (within four years
of discovery of the fraud). In Combs v. Watson, 32 Ohio St 228 (1877) it was held
that the cause accrued upon discovery whether judgment then obtained or not, since
procurement of judgment was not a prerequisite to suit.
Okla. Ziska v. Ziska, 20 Okla. 634, 95 Pac. 254 (1908); White v. Exchange Nat.
Bank, 172 Okla. 331, 44 P. (2d) (1935) (may sue without judgment if debtor insolvent,
non-resident, or absconded. Deed to daughter 1923. Plaintiff discovered fraud 1927.
No record sufficient for constructive notice. Not barred). Cf. Akers v. Rennie, 182
Okla. 378, 77 P. (2d) 1112 (1938), holding that in absence of laches in obtaining
judgment and execution, the statute begins to run on return of execution.
S. C. Tucker v. Weathersbee, 98 S. C. 402, 82 S. E. 638 (1914). Cf. Amaker v.
New, 33 S. C. 28, 11 S. E. 386 (1889) to same effect, but holding the action involved
to be for the recovery of possession of property purchased at execution sale, the
fraudulent deed being merely a link in defendant's chain of title. If the action is
based on constructive fraud, it accrues upon return of execution. Suber v. Chandler,
18 S. C. 526 (1882) ; Nat. Bank of Newberry v. Kinard, 28 S. C. 101, 5 S .E. 464 (1887).
Tex. Horsley v. Phillips, 126 S. W. (2d) 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) ; Hoerster v.
Wilke, 138 Tex. 263, 158 S. W. (2d) 288 (1942); Eckert v. Wendel, 120 Tex. 618
40 S. W. (2d) 796 (1931). (The action is within the fraud section, four years from
discovery, but if the creditor procures attachment or judgment lien the action to en-
force it will not be barred except by adverse possession for three or five years as the
particular statute requires.)
Utah. Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P. (2d) 264 (1932)
Wash. Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Adams, 38 Wash. 75, 80 Pac. 284 (1905) ; Davison v.
Hewitt, 6 Wash. (2d) 131, 106 P. (2d) 733 (1940). But the action is not maintainable
after the expiration of six years from rendition of judgment, since by statute the lien
of the judgment cannot be extended for a longer period. Johnson v. Great Northern
Lumber Co., 85 Wash. 16, 147 Pac. 641 (1915).
Wis. Sheldon v. Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co., 8 Fed. 769 (C. C. W. D. Wis.
1881) (within six years after fraud discovered) ; Foote v. Harrison, 137 Wis. 588, 119
N. W. 291 (1909)..
5 1IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 2-601.
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there is held barred by the expiration of six years after the recording of the
conveyance.5 9 A like construction was given the Alabanma statute in Van
Ingen v. Duffin. The statement in the opinion in that case to the effect
that the cause of action accrues upon the date of the conveyance has, how-
ever, since been explained in Van Antwerp v. Van Antwerp.6 1
The discovery of the fraud does not start the statute of limitations run-
ning even in those jurisdictions which hold the fraud statute applicable to
an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance.6 2 Time cannot commence
to run until the creditor has the right to sue, and in the absence of statute,
that right accrues upon the procurement of judgment or upon the return
of execution. The application of the discovery of the fraud rule gives the
creditor extended time if he has failed to commence his action within the
appointed time after judgment, or judgment and return of execution. This
accepted theory might have given way under the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act, but there is no evidence, except in New York, that the rule
has been changed. The question is still open in California where the uni-
form act was not adopted until 1939. Brunvold v. Johnson & Co.6 was de-
cided in 1943, but the action bad been commenced within three years of the
effective date of the statute. The court said: "Any new right conferred by
§ 3439.09 could only accrue on the date that that section became effective"
and held that the action was not barred. Whether the courts in California,
in view of the new rights conferred upon the general creditor, will hold that
the cause of action accrues, prior to judgment, upon the discovery of the
fraud remains to be determined.
A substantial body of authority supports the view that the cause of action
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance accrues when judgment is procured
upon the creditor's claim. In Arkansas the creditor may sue within ten
years after obtaining judgment, the statutory time for enforcement of a
judgment against the debtor's property. If he sues within that time he will
not be barred unless the grantee has had adverse possession for the statu-
tory period of seven years.6 A. Baldin & Co. v. Will=ns 5 illustrates the
Arkansas rule in both of its aspects. The grantor's tenant, grantee in one
of the conveyances, had been in possession over seven years since the con-
59Todd v. Eberwine, 216 Ind. 47, 22 N. E. (2d) 977 (1939).
60158 Ala. 318, 48 So. 507 (1909).
61242 Ala. 92, 5 So. (2d) 73 (1941).62See note 57 supra.
6359 Cal. App. (2d) 75, 138 P. (2d) 32 (1943).
64 James v. Mallory, 76 Ark. 509, 89 S. W. 472 (1905) ; A. Baldwin & Co. v. Williams,
74 Ark. 316, 86 S. W. 423 (1905).65See note 64 supra.
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veyance was made. As to him the complaint was dismissed. It was sustained,
however, as to the transferee of another tract who was not in possession
adversely. The rule is the same in Missouri except that in that state the
prescriptive period is ten years. In Louisiana, by statute, 6 a one-year statute
of limitation is prescribed for the revocatory action, the time to be counted
from the time that judgment is obtained if the action is brought by an
individual creditor. If brought by syndics or other representatives of the
creditors collectively, it is measured from the time of their appointment.
In Minnesota6P7 and South Dakota,68 the cause accrues when judgment is
obtained. In Lind v. 0. N. Johnson Co.,69 distinction is drawn between the
creditor's suit to reach the debtor's equitable interest in property and that
to set aside the fraudulent transfer. As to the former, the return of execu-
tion is a condition precedent to the creditor's right to sue; as to the latter,
judgment alone is necessary. And limitations start to run at the time the right
to commence an action first comes into being. Iowa, Kansas, and Oklahomra
are in accord with the view that the cause of action accrues upon procure-
ment of judgment, but conditionally. The creditor must not be guilty of un-
due delay in reducing his claim to judgment.1 0 In Somers v. Spaulding,7 1
a note was given in 1932, due two years later. The day the note was given
the makers made and recorded a deed to their daughters. The creditor ob-
tained judgment on the note in 1938 and promptly sued to set aside the
conveyance. A defense of laches based upon the four years delay in obtain-
ing judgment was sustained.
In some states the cause of action is not deemed to have accrued until
the return of execution. It has been held by courts in Kansas7 2 that the
return of execution is a prerequisite unless the debtor is insolvent. The
6 6 LA. Civ. CODE ANN. (Dart, 1932) art. 1994; Gast v. Gast, 206 La. 285, 19 So.
(2d) 138 (1944); First Nat. Bank v. Pierson, 180 La. 48, 156 So. 171 (1934); Dixie
Homestead Ass'n v. Intravaia, 183 La. 556, 164 So. 413 (1935). The section, however,
applies only to actual sales, not simulated ones which are not prescriptible. Modisette
v. Hathaway, 147 La. 1035, 86 So. 485 (1920).67Lind v. 0. N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 282 N. W. 661, 119 A. L. R. 940 (1938);
Rounds v. Green, 29 Minn. 139, 12 N. W. 454 (1882). Cf. Brasie v. Minn. Brewing Co.,
'87 Minn. 456, 92 N. W. 340 (1902) (statute begins to run from date of execution
sale unless plaintiff did not discover the fraud until some later time).6 5Watt v. Morrow, 19 S. D. 317, 103 N. W. 45 (1905.).
69See note 67 supra.70Mickel v. Walraven, 92 Iowa 423. 60 N. W. 633 (1894); Stubblefield v. Gadd, 112
Iowa 681, 84 N. W. 917 (1901); Bristow v. Lange, 221 Iowa 904, 266 N. W. 808
(1936) ; Somers v. Spaulding, 229 Iowa 432, 294 N. W. 610, 133 A. L. R. 1300 (1940) ;
Lowell-Woodward Co. v. Davis, 105 Kan. 028, 185 Pac. 732, 17 A. L. R. 719
(1919) ; Donaldson, v. Jacobitz, 67 Kan. 244, 72 Pac. 846 (1903).
71rbid.
72Lowell-Woodward Co. v. Davis, 105 Kan. 628, 185 Pac. 732 (1919).
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-creditor has in Michigan one year after levy of his execution to begin his
action.73 In Oregon the cause of action-accrues upon return of execution.74
The same is true in South Carolina if the action is based on constructive
fraud.75
A suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance is analogized in a few juris-
dictions to an action to recoVer property, real or personal ai the case may be.
In Alabama such a suit is a suit for the recovery of real property, if the
transfer was of lands, and the ten-year statute of limitations applies. 76
It was said in Van Ingen v. Duffn77 that the cause accrues on the date of
the conveyance, but in Van Antwerp v. Van Antwerp7 s it was decided that
the statute does not necessarily start to run when the transfer is made. Ad-
verse possession was held to be an essential feature of the statute of limi-
tations as a defense to an action for the recovery of property real or per-
sonal and the cause of action accrues when the grantee asserts his claim of
ownership by a hostile possession. In Georgia the rule seems to be the same.
at least insofar as a transfer of realty is concerned! 9 A change of possession
under a fraudulent conveyance has been held in Missouri to commence an
adverse possession which, if continued for ten years, will bar the creditor's
action.80 And seven years adverse possession after the right of the creditor
to enforce his debt accrued, was held, in Ramsey v. Quillen,)" to be a bar.
In Texas, if the creditor has procured a judgment lien, his action to enforce
his lien against lands fraudulently conveyed is not barred until the grantee
acquires full title under some statute of limitations which would bar an
action for the recovery of real estate.
8 2
In a few jurisdictions the statute of limitations is held inapplicable, except
by analogy, to actions in equity to avoid fraudulent conveyances, and unless
a defense of laches is sustained, the action will not be barred. There are
73Daniel v. Palmer, 124 Mich. 335, 82 N. W. 1067 (1900); Rohrabacher v. Walsh,
170 Mich. 59, 135 N. W. 907 (1912) ; Canpan v. Fleischer, 235 Mich. 500, 209
N. W. 563 (1926).74Williams v. Comm. Nat. Bk., 49 Ore. 492, 90 Pac. 1012 (1907).
75Suber v. Chandler, 18 S. C. 526 (1882).
76Drummond v. Drummond, 232 Ala. 401, 168 So. 428 (1936) ; Van Ingen v. Duffin,
158 Ala. 318, 48 So. 507 (1909).
77Ibid.
78242 Ala. 92, 5 So. (2d) 73 (1941). To same effect: Rowe v. Bonneau-Jeter Hard-
ware Co., 245 Ala. 326, 16 So. (2d) 689, 158 A. L. R. 1266 (1943).79Beasley v. Smith, 144 Ga. 377, 87 S. E. 293 (1915).
S0Bobb v. Woodward, 50 Mo. 95 (1872); Rogers v.,Brown, 61 Mo. 187 (1875). And
see Steele v. Reid, 284 Mo. 269, 223 S. W. 881 (1920). The action may be barred by
laches. Wall v. Beedy, 161 Mo. 625, 61 S. W. -864 (1901) (nine years delay while
property enhanced in value.-Barred by laches).
815 Lea (73 Tenn.) 184 (1880).
82Eckert v. Wendel, 120 Tex. 618, 40 S. W. (2d) 796 (1931).
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decisions to this effect in Georgia,83 Illinois,84 and Mississippi,85 and in Vir-
ginia and West Virginia, as has been noted above,8 6 the statute of limitations
does not apply to actions to set aside conveyances tainted with actual fraud.
C. Actions Against Directors and Officers by Creditors of Corporations
I. The New York Statutes
When a judgment creditor of a corporation discovers that the corpora-
tion's assets are insufficient to satisfy his debt, he may have recourse, in a
proper case, pursuant to statutes enacted for his protection, against trans-
ferees of the corporation's property or against the directors and officers of
the debtor corporation. The New York statutes which provide these reme-
dies are General Corporation Law, sections 60, 61, and Stock Corporation
Law, sections 15, 58, 59, 61, and 114. The purpose of section 114 of the
Stock Corporation Law is to impose upon directors, officers, and stockhold-
ers of foreign corporations- transacting business in this state, the liabilities
imposed upon directors, officers, and stockholders of domestic corporations
by the other statutes mentioned above.87 A statement of the nature of the
remedies provided is necessary to a consideration of the applicable statute
of limitations.
Section 15 of the Stock Corporation Law prohibits the transfer of any
property of a corporation to a director, officer, or stockholder for any con-
sideration other than full value in cash, if the corporation has refused to
pay any of its obligations when due. It invalidates also every conveyance
or transfer of any of the property of a corporation made with intent to
prefer any creditor at a time when the corporation is insolvent or its in-
solvency is imminent, if the transferee knows that a preference is intended.
The person who receives any property of a corporation by an act prohibited
by the section is bound to account to the corporation's creditors, stockhold-
ers, or trustees. The directors and officers of the corporation concerned in
any prohibited act are made personally liable to the creditors and stock-
holders to the extent of any loss they may sustain.
Section 60 of the General Corporation Law provides for certain actions
83Remington-Rand Inc. v. Emory U., 185 Ga. 571, 196 S. E. 58 (1938) ; Gormley
v. Wilson, 176 Ga. 711, 168 S. E. 568 (1933).84Greenman v. Greenman, 107 Ill. 404 (1883). See also Motel v. Andracki, 299 Ill.
App. 166, 19 N. E. (2d) 832 (1939) (delay not prejudicial-laches not a bar) ; Messick
v. Mohr, 292 II. App. 69, 10 N. E. (2d) 870 (1937) (parties who combine to defraud
creditors are precluded from relying on laches).85Abbey v. Commercial Bk. of New Orleans, 31 Miss. 434 (1856).
86See notes 41-44 supra.StGerman American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N. Y. 57, 109 N. E. 875 (1915).
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against directors and officers of a corporation. By that section, and section 61,
a creditor may maintain an action against directors and officers for the fol-
lowing relief: (1) to compel them to account for their conduct including any
neglect of or failure to perform their duties; (2) to compel them to pay
to the corporation, or to its creditors, any money and the value of any
property, which they have acquired to themselves, or transferred to others,
or lost or wasted through any neglect of or other violation of their du-
ties; (3) to set aside a transfer of property made by them contrary to a
provision of law where the transferee knew the purpose of the transfer;
or (4) to enjoin such a transfer.
Section 58 of the Stock Corporation Law prohibits the declaration of
dividends out of capital. Directors in office when a prohibited payment of
dividends is made, except those relieved by the terms of the statute, are
made jointly and severally liable to the corporation and its creditors to the
amount of any loss sustained by reason of the dividend. Loans to stock-
holders are prohibited by section 59 of the Stock Corporation Law, and the
officers and directors making, or assenting to, such loan are made jointly
and severally liable, to the extent of the loan and interest, for debts of
the corporation contracted before the repayment of the loan. Section 61 of
the Stock Corporation Law provides creditors a remedy against directors
and officers for, having made false reports upon which the creditors relied.
The statutes reflect the view that the assets of a corporation constitute a
trust fund for the payment of its debts.88 Collusive and preferential trans-
fers may be set aside and personal liability may be decreed against directors
and officers concerned in making them to the extent of the creditors' loss.
Most of the cases deal with misconduct of that nature. The creditor may
sue, however, where negligence or other violation of the director's duties
causes loss. 9 , There is some overlapping in the remedies afforded.90 Trans-
fers invalidated by corporation laws may be fraudulent as to creditors,
and remediable under the provisions of the Debtor and Creditor Law. The
several sections of the corporation laws above mentioned reach into each
other to some extent. It is not unusual to have complaints setting forth sev-
eral causes of action although the creditor's sole purpose is to undo a single
corporate transaction. Whalen v. Strong presented a complaint simpler in
form. According to its averments, pleaded as a single cause of action, the
S8 Darcy v. B. & N. Y. Ferry Co., 196 N.' Y. 99, 89 N. E. 461 (1909).
89N. Y. GEN-axL Coiu. LAW §§ 60, 61.
90See Whalen v. Strong, 230 .App. Div. 617, 246 N. Y. Supp. 40 (4th Dep't 1930),
aff'd, 275 N. Y. 516, 11 N. E. (2d) 321 (1937).
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directors of a corporation had transferred a tract of land to the corporation's
principal stockholders just prior to the entry of plaintiff's judgment against
the corporation. The complaint charged that the transfer was for an in-
adequate, or for no consideration, with intent to give the stockholder a
preference, to make the corporation insolvent and to prevent the property be-
coming subject to the lien of the judgment. The relief sought was an ac-
counting, a reconveyance to the corporation, cancellation of the deed, a re-
ceivership, an injunction, and that plaintiff's judgment be paid by the de-
fendant directors. The special term held that three causes of action were
pleaded and ordered that they be separately stated. The appellate division
reversed and held that the complaint stated but a single cause, and that in
aid of execution. "These statutes [Stock Corporation Law, section 15, and
General Corporation Law, sections 60, 61] are remedial. They furnish ad-
ditional remedies. They are in extension, not in exclusion, of existing reme-
dies, statutory, equitable or at common law." 91
The creditor may sue in his own right. The question was presented in
Caesar v. Bernard, an action 'based upon the predecessor of Stock Corpora-
tion Law, section 15, and the court held:
"The liability created by this statute against directors and officers is for
the loss sustained by creditors through wrongful acts of directors and
officers by which the funds of the corporation have been depleted, and
instead of requiring that the action shall be brought by, or in the right
of the corporation to restore its funds, the legislature gave a cause of
action to the creditors and stockholders in their own right to recover
the damages sustained.1
92
Buckley v. Stansfield93 was an action by a creditor against directors of a
corporation under the predecessors of General Corporation Law, sections 60,
61. At a time when the liabilities of the corporation exceeded its assets, the
directors transferred all its property to another corporation. Defendants
contended that plaintiff could recover only in a representative capacity in
behalf of the corporation or all creditors. The court held that, at least
where there is no showing that there are other creditors similarly situated,
recovery could be had by plaintiff as an individual creditor. That other
creditors will be protected is indicated by the fact that the judgment in
Whalen v. Strong"4 was modified to provide that if there were other creditors
19Id. at 621, 246 N. Y. Supp. at 45.
92156 App. Div. 724, 727, 141 N. Y. Supp. 659, 662 (1st Dep't 1913), aff'd, 209 N. Y.
570, 103 N. E. 1122 (1913).
93155 App. Div. 735, 140 N. Y. Supp. 953 (4th Dep't 1913), aff'd, 214 N. Y. 679,
108 N. E. 1101 (1915).94See sipra note 90.
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similarly situated, the plaintiff creditor could recover only his pro rata
share.9 5
II. The Computation of the Statute of Limitations in New York
Of the New York corporation laws herein considered the only one which
provides its own statute of limitations is section 61 of the Stock Corpora-
tion Law. The action therein authorized, based upon the making of false
reports, cannot be maintained after the expiration of two years from the
time that the report was made.9 6 Nor does the Civil Practice Act prescribe
expressly a statute of limitations for creditors' actions against directors and
officers of corporations other than moneyed corporations. A three-year
statute of limitations is provided as to actions against a director or stock-
holder of a moneyed corporation to recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed,
or to enforce a liability created by the common law or by statute.97 The cause
of action is not deemed to have accrued until discovery by the plaintiff of
the facts under which the penalty or forfeiture attached or the liability was
created.
98
The statute of limitations begins to run against creditors' actions which
owe their existence to Stock Corporation Law sections 15, 58, or General
Corporation Law sections 60, subd. 5, and 61 when execution upon the judg-
ment is returned unsatisfied.99 Until that time the creditor has no cause of
action, and limitations do not commence to run until the right capable of
present enforcement first comes into being.'00 Buttles v. Smith' was an
action in behalf of a creditor of an insolvent corporation against three
brokerage firms, the transferees of the corporation's funds. The creditor had
obtained judgment against the corporation in 1933 upon an obligation due
in 1926 and execution was returned unsatisfied. The action against the
brokers was commenced in 1938. The funds paid to the brokers were in
payment of debts owing from the corporation's two stockholders and direc-
tors. It was held that the causes of action based upon the Debtor and
Creditor Law accrued when the transfers were made; those based upon
25 Whalen v. Strong, 248 App. Div. 672, 289 N. Y. Supp. 19 (4th Dep't 1936). Upon
reargument the judgment was again modified to allow the creditor the whole of hisjudgment, there being no showing that there were other creditors. Whalen v. Strong,
249 App. Div. 792, 292 N. Y. Supp. 385 (4th Dep't 1936).
16N. Y. STOCK CORP. LAW § 61.9 7 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 49 (4).
MlUid.09 Buttles v. Smith, 281 N. Y. 226, 22 N. E. (2d) 350 (1939).
'OoShepard Co. v. Taylor Pub. Co., 234 N. Y. 465, 138 N. E. 409 (1923).
101281 N. Y. 226, 22 N. E. (2d) 350 (1939).
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the corporation laws accrued upon the return of the execution. A like de-
cision was rendered in Rosenkranz v. Doran'0 2 in which the action was based
upon Stock Corporation Law section 58 and General Corporation Law
section 60. A corporation had conveyed land in 1926, covenanting against in-
cumbrances. Neither vendor nor vendee knew, until 1938, that a prior deed
contained a restriction against apartment houses. An action begun in 1938
for rescission resulted in 1940 in a judgment against the corporation. The
corporation was then insolvent, the assets having been distributed to the
officers in the form of salaries from 1926 to 1939. Considering the unknown
indebtedness to the vendee, the withdrawals were being made while capital
was impaired. The action against the officers was not barred by limitations.
Buttles v. Smith'0 3 has recently been distinguished in Hastings v. Byllesby
& Co.104 In the former case it was held that an action, brought under sub-
division 5 of section 60 of the General Corporation Law, accrued upon the
return unsatisfied of the creditor's execution. The action was brought by a
receiver, appointed in an action in aid of the execution, to set aside trans-
fer of a corporation's assets to creditors of the corporation's directors and
officers. In the latter case, a trustee in bankruptcy of the corporation sued
under subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 60 of the General Corporation Law,
to recover moneys and property of the corporation which defendants alleged-
ly had "wasted, disposed of, or took unlawfully and fraudulently, and to
recover profits which ... the defendants wrongfully appropriated." It was
held that the action was derivative and that since an action by the corpora-
tion itself was barred at the time of the appointment of the trustee, an
action by the trustee was likewise barred. In Buttles v. Snvith, the receiver
sought a remedy, it was said, for "a wrong to the creditor . . . independent
and distinct from any wrong to the corporate debtor," while in Hastings v.
Byllesby & Co., the cause of action asserted by the trustee was "based upon
a wrong done to the corporate debtor." The result, in this most recent case,
would have been the same, it would seem, if the action had been brought
by an individual creditor, for the court significantly says:
"We assume arguendo that the action ... is brought in behalf of cred-
itors for the relief specified in subdivisions 1 and 2 of section 60,
though there may be little in the complaint to support that assumption.
Even so the fact remains that the cause of action is based upon a wrong
to the debtor. The cause of action accrued to the debtor when the
wrong occurred and though the statute permits a creditor or stockhold-
102264 App. Div. 335, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 413 (2d Dep't 1942).
103281 N. Y. 226, 22 N. E. (2d) 350 (1939).
104293 N. Y. 404, 57 N. E. (2d) 733 (1944).
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er to bring an action for the wrong done to the corporation, the damage
or injury to a creditor, like the damage or injury to a stockholder, arises
only indirectly from the damage or injury to the corporation and is
repaired when the damage or injury to the corporation is repaired."'10 5
An action by a creditor pursuant to the first two subdivisions of the Gen-
eral Corporation Law must, therefore, be commenced within the time'limited
for an action by the corporation to recover for the wrong done. The relief
obtainable in an action against directors or officers, as provided in those sub-
divisions, is as follows:
1. To compel the defendants to account for their official conduct in-
cluding any neglect of or failure to perform their duties, in the manage-
ment and disposition of funds and property, committed to their charge.
2. To compel them to pay to the corporation, or to its creditors any
money and the value of any property which they have acquired
to themselves, or transferred to others, or lost, or wasted, by or through
any neglect of or failure to perform or other violation of their duties.
The complaint in Hastings v. Byllesby & Co. charged Haystone Securities
Corporation with having conspired with the directors of the debtor corpora-
tion to waste the assets of the latter. The syndicate of which Haystone Se-
curities Corporation was a member was alleged to have realized a large
cash profit as a result of a transfer of certain shares of stock to the debtor
corporation. In the Appellate Division, which reversed "the Special Term,
it was pointed out that the action, unlike that in Buttles v. Smith, was not
one to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. The Court there said:
"Plaintiff was not trying to get from Haystone its share of the pro-
ceeds of any property acquired by the Ladenburg syndicate; it was
charging it with liability for all the wrongful acts of the corporate
fiduciaries, and those acting in concert with it."' 0 6
It was pointed out, further, that there was no claim that the debtor cor-
poration had any creditors, nor that the rights of creditors had in any way
been impaired, nor even that the solvency of the corporation had been
affected. And the court. concluded that "although plaintiff [the trustee in
bankruptcy] has the rights of a creditor, as well as those of Standard [the
debtor corporation], he is presently asserting the rights of Standard deriva-
tively."'10 7 It was unnecessary for the Appellate Division to decide what
the result would have been if it had been alleged that creditors existed.
1OSId. at 410, 57 N. E. (2d) at 736.
106265 App. Div. 643, 649, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 299, 304 (1st Dep't 1943).
107265 App. Div. 642, 650, 40 N. Y. S. (2d) 299, 304 (1st Dep't (1943).
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The Court of Appeals nevertheless assumed that the action was brought in
behalf of creditors, and even upon that assumption, affirmed the judgment
of dismissal. The distinction which is drawn is between creditors' suits based
upon the first two subdivisions of section 60 of the General Corporation Law
and those based upon the fifth subdivision of that section. As to the former,
the cause of action accrues when the wrong is done; as to the latter, the
cause accrues upon the return unsatisfied of the creditor's execution. In
neither instance, however, does the creditor have the right to sue unless he
is a judgment creditor. 08
III. Computation of the Statute of Linvtations-Comparative Law
In several states there are statutes expressly providing a statute of limita-
tions for actions against directors and officers of corporations. Two of these
suggest strongly a legislative intention to encourage individuals to accept di-
rectorships. The Michigan10 9 statute provides for actions against directors
and officers for the violation of or failure to perform their duties whereby
the corporation's property is lost or wasted or transfered to one or more
of them, and for actions to enjoin or set aside unlawful transfers. No
director can be held for a delinquency under the section, however, after
the expiration of six years from the date of the delinquency, or after two
years from the time the delinquency is discovered, whichever shall sooner
occur. In Pennsylvan0id1 ° an action cannot be maintained against a director
'
0
.OLevy v. Paramount Publix Corp., 149 Misc. 129, 266 N. Y. Supp. 271 (Sup. Ct.
1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div. 711, 269 N. Y. Supp. 997 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd. 265 N. Y.
629, 193 N. E. 418 (1934) ; Steele v. Isman, 164 App. Div. 146, 149 N. Y. Supp. 488
(Ist Dep't 1914); Swan v. Mutual Reserve Ass'n, 20 App. Div. 255, 46 N. Y. Supp.
841 (4th Dep't 1897), aff'd, 155 N. Y. 9, 49 N. E. 258 (1898) ; Bristol Mfg. Corp. v.
Elk Textile Co., 121 Misc. 138, 200 N. Y. Supp. 860 (Sup. Ct. 1923), aff'd, 209 App.
Div. 95, 204 N. Y. Supp. 427 (1st Dep't 1924); Belknap v. W. A. Life Ins. Co., 11
Hun 232 (1877).
109Micnr. STAT. ANN. § 21.47, "... action may be brought by the corporation, through
or by a director, officer or shareholder, or a creditor, or receiver, or trustee in bank-
ruptcy, or by- the attorney general of the state on behalf of the corporation against
one or more of the delinquent directors, officers or agents, for the violation of, or
failure to perform, the duties above prescribed or any duties prescribed by this act,
whereby the corporation has been or will be injured or damaged or its property lost,
or wasted, or transferred to one or more of them, or to enjoin a proposed, or set aside
a completed, unlawful transfer of the corporate property to one knowing the purpose
thereof. The foregoing shall in no way preclude or affect any action any individual
shareholder or creditor or other person may have against any director, officer or agent
for any violation of any duty owed by them or any of them to such shareholder, creditor,
or other persons. No director or directors shall be held liable for any delinquency
under this section after six years from the date of such delinquency, or after two
years from the time when such delinquency is discovered by one complaining thereof,
whichever shall sooner occur."
110 PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) Tit.' 12, § 41. "Limitation of suits against stock-
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to charge him with any neglect of duty as a director after the expiration
of six years after the commission of the act of neglect.
Six states' have prescribed statutes of limitation for actions against
directors and officers of all corporations, but of a limited application. They
are in substantially the same form. The action against a director to recover
a penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to enforce a liability created by law,
must be brought within a specified time after discovery of the facts by the
aggrieved party. The Georgia statute," 2 however, provides a twenty year
statute of limitations, computed from the date of accrual for "suits for the
enforcement of rights accruing to individuals under statutes, acts of in-
corporation, or by operation of law." A Virginia statute113 prescribes a two
year limitation for suits against directors for any liability imposed by the
laws bf the state. The action must be commenced within two years "after
such right of action shall accrue."
Four states," 4 including New York, expressly limit the time for suit
against directors of money corporations to recover a penalty or forfeiture,
or to enforce a liability created by law. Again the action is deemed to have
accrued upon discovery of the facts.
In fourteen states, n' 5 the statutes imposing liability upon directors for
holders and directors. It is hereby declared to be the true intent and meaning of the
statutes of limitation, that no suit, at law or in equity, shall be brought or maintained
against any stockholder or director in any corporation or association, to charge him
with any claim for materials or moneys for which said corporation or association
could be sued, or with any neglect of duty as such stockholder or director, except within
six years after the 'delivery of the materials or merchandise, or the lending to or de-
posit of money with said corporation or association, or the commission of such act
of negligence by such stockholder or director."
111CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (1941) § 359. ". .. This title does not affect actions against
directors or stockholders of a corporation to recover a penalty or forfeiture imposed,
or to enforce liability created by law; but such actions must be brought within three
years after the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts upon which the penalty
or forfeiture attached, or the liability was created." IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 5-237;
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. (Anderson and McFarland, 1935) § 9061; NEv. Comp. LAWS(Hillyer 1929) § 8541; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) § 104-2-35.
'
1 2 GA. CODE ANN. § 3-704.
1 13 VA. CODE ANN. (1942) § 3816.114N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 49(4) ; GEN. STAT. N. CAR. (1943) § 1-33 (three years
after discovery) ; N. D. Comi. LAwS ANN. (1913) § 73.93 (six years after discovery) ; S.C.
CODE (1942) § 367 (six years after discovery) ; WIs. STAT. (1943) § 330-51 (six years
after discovery).115DEL. REv. CODE (1935) § 2067 (six years); FLA. Comp. ,GEN. LAWS ANN. § 612.57
(two years) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 29-130 (2 years-liability is to corporation
only); LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1939) § 1107 (two years); Micn. STAT. ANN.
(1937) § 21.48 (3 years) ; MINN. STAT. (1945) § 301-23 (three years-liability to cor-
poration) ; NEV. Coi,. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 1674 (three years) ; N. J. Comp. STAT.
(1911) Tit. 4:8-19 (six years), The statute applies only to payment of dividends by a
going concern, not to a distribution of all the assets to stockholders. Beatty v. Peter-
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unlawfully paying dividends out of capital, or authorizing or permitting un-
lawful distribution of a corporation's assets, prescribe the time within
which the action must be brought. The time generally runs from the date
of the payment or distribution. Three states1 16 provide, however, that no
statute of limitations shall be a bar to an action against a director to recover
upon the liability created by the statute. Such a provision formerly existed
in North Dakota but the statute"17 was amended in 1919 to provide instead:
"No action or proceeding to enforce or recover any penalty, forfeiture, or
liability hereunder shall be commenced more than six months after the
aggrieved party shall have had actual notice of the violation. . . ." The two
year limitation in the Ohio statute does not apply to an action brought by a
creditor, the statute providing that the creditor cannot maintain the action
until after procurement of judgment against the corporation, or after the
corporation's bankruptcy or dissolution." 8
In Ohio1 9 and Rhode Islanc120 the statutes imposing liability upon direc-
tors maldng false reports limit the time for maintaining the action to four
and two years, respectively, after the act complained of.
In the majority of states the courts must determine, without the benefit
of a precise statute, the statute of limitations applicable to the particular
action against directors or officers, and the date of accrual of the cause
of action as well. Their conclusions depend to a great extent upon the
construction of the statute imposing liability. Is the statute penal or is it
remedial? In either case, does the cause of action accrue upon the date of
violation of the statute, or upon the incurring of the obligation to the creditor,
or upon its maturity, or at the time the creditor discovers the underlying
facts? Is the statute' postponed until the creditor procures judgment and
has execution against the property of the corporation returned unsatisfied?
The cases do not fall into a single pattern. There is substantial uniformity
in judicial construction of the modern statutes as being penal or r.emedial.
Usually they are held to be remedial as far as the creditor's remedies are con-
son, etc. Bus Co., 126 N. J. Eq. 472, 9 A. (2d) 686 (1939) ; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1941)
§ 54-317 (six years); GEN. STAT. N. CAR. (1943) § 55-116; N. D. REv. CODE (1943)
§ 10-0522 (six months after notice) ; OHIo CODE ANN. (Baldwin, 1940) § 8623-123c (two
years-inapplicable to creditor's action) ; R. I. GEN. LAws (1938) Ch. 116, § 41 (six
years); TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 3759 (two years).
11 6 MoNT. REv. CoDEs ANN. (Anderson and McFarland, 1935) § 5939; N. M. STAT.
ANN. (1941) § 74-118 (applicable only to railroads and other carriers); OKLA. STAT.
(1941) Tit. 18, § 106.
n7 See supra note 115.
1SChisnell v. Ozier Co., 140 Ohio St. 355, 44 N. E. (2d) 464 (1942).
119 OHIo CODE ANN. (Baldwin, 1940) § 8623-123.
12 0R. I. GEN. LAws (1938) Ch. 116, § 44.
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cerned, and not within the statutes providing limitations for actions to re-
cover a penalty or forfeiture. A New York statute imposing liability upon
directors "for all the debts of the company then existing, and for all that
shall thereafter be contracted" for having failed to file an annual report,
was held to be penal. The reason was that the liability had no relation to
the actual loss or injury sustained by the creditor.121
There is some authority for the view that directors are trustees of an
express trust and that the statute does not commence to run until the trust
is repudiated or the cestui que trust discovers the wrongdoing.
1 22 Most
courts, however, conceding that directors are trustees, hold that the trust
is constructive and permit a plea of limitations.
1 23
Where the statute imposes liability upon the directors for the creditor's
"debts" the cause of action is generally held to have accrued either upon the
contracting of the obligation or upon its maturity.124 In California the
cause is held to have accrued upon the date it is contracted even though
the claim will not mature until after the creditor's right to sue will be barred
by limitations.1 25 The discovery provision of the California statute is held
to apply only to actions for a penalty or forfeiture. A like result is reached
in Montana the court there saying, however, that the cause of action accrues
when the liability is created by law. 1 26 In Arkansas the cause of action ac-
crues when the debt is contracted.
1 27
Most of the cases dealing with directors' liability to creditors involve un-
lawful payment of dividends or wrongful distribution of assets to stock-
holders. It is generally held that the cause of action accrues when the divi-
dends are paid or the transfer is made.128 In Utah it has been held that the
2I2 Merchants Bank v. Bliss, 35 N. Y. 412 (1866).
122Williams v. McKay, 40 N. J. Eq. 189, 53 Am. Rep. 775 (1885) (Action against
directors of a savings bank). Cf. Cole v. Brandle, 127 N. J. Eq. 31, 11 A. (2d) 255
(1940) (an action based on illegal loans to stockholders, holding a suitor cannot be
depiived of his remedy in equity on ground of laches unless it appears he had knowledge
of his rights and neglected prompt prosecution) ; Greenfield Say. Bank v. Abercrombie,
211 Mass. 252, 97 N. E. 897 (1912).
'
23White v. Fed. Dep. Ins. Corp., 122 F. (2d) 770 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941) ; Dept. of Bank-
ing v. McMullen, 134 Neb. 338, 278 N. W. 551 (1938) ; Wallace v. Lincoln Savings Bk., 89
Tenn. 630, 15 S. W. 448 (1891).
124Morgan v. Hedstrom, 164 N. Y. 224, 58 N. E. 26 (1900) (failure to file report
when debt matured).
125Hunt v. Ward, 99 Cal. 612, 34 P. 335 (1893) ; Pourroy v. Gardner, 122 Cal. App.
521, 10 P. (2d) 815 (1932).
12 6Williams v. Hilger, 77 Mont. 399, 251 P. 524 (1926).
127Continental Nat. Bank v. Buford, 107 Fed. 188 (C. C. Ed. Ark. 1901), aff'd,
114 Fed. 290 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902).
'
28Pourroy v. Gardner, 122 Cal. App. 521, 10 P. (2d) 815 (1932) ; McNair v. Burt,
68 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Lexington & 0. R. Co. v. Bridges, 7 B. Mon.
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rule applicable to a transfer of the 'corporation's assets is the same as in the
ordinary case of a fraudulent, conveyance of property by a failing debtor,
i.e., limitations begin to run when the fraud is or should be discovered. 129
The liability imposed in Oregon is for "debts" and the cause accrues upon
maturity of the creditor's claim against the corporation. 30  In Chatham v.
Mecklenburg R. Co.,1 3 1 the creditor sued to recover assets distributed to
stockholders and creditors, and the court held that the cause of action did
not accrue until the return of the execution issued against the corporation.
Sometimes the liability is predicated upon the directors having made ex-
cessive. loans, or contracted excessive debts, in violation of a statute. Generally
the cause of action is held to have accrued when the excessive loans are made or
the excessive indebtedness contracted,13' although the courts usually are careful
to say that the case involves no fraud or concealment. It has been held in South
Dakota, however, that the action is to recover upon a liability created by statute
accruing when the creditor discovers the facts as to the making of excessive
loans.'33 And in New Jersey, the court applied the equity discovery rule to
an action based upon a statute forbidding lbans to stockholders, and making
assenting directors liable for debts to the extent of the loans. 134 In Vermont
a cause of action based upon excessive loans was held to accrue when the
creditors' debt was contracted. 35
The cases are few which deal with the statute of limitations in creditors'
actions against directors founded upon negligence. Purcell v. Baker 36 was
an action founded upon negligent management of a bank. The five-year
statute for actions on a liability created by statute was held applicable, and since
the bank had closed its doors more than five years before the action was begun,
the complaint was dismissed. It was said that the cause accrued, at the
556: 46 Am. Dec. 528 (Ky. 1847); McGill's Adm'x v. Phillips, 243 Ky. 768, 49 S. W.
(2d) 1025 (1932) ; Detroit Trust Co. v. Goodrich, 175 Mich. 168, 141 N. W. 882 (1913)
(so long as defendant was innocent); Thomas v. Richter, 88 Wash. 451, 153 P. 333(1915) ; Peeples v. Hayes, 156 Cal. 286, 104 P. (2d) 305 (1941) ;'Coombes v. Getz,
217 Cal. 320, 18 P. (2d) 939 (1933) (liability of directors for moneys embezzled by
officers); Williams v. Davis, 182 Minn. 186, 234 N. W. 11 (1930) (conversion bydirectors).dirAmercan Theatre Co. v. Glasmann, 95 Utah 303, 80 P. (2d) 922 (1938).
'
5 0Patterson v. Wade, 115 Fed. 771 (C. C. ,A. 9th, 1902).
11180 N. C. 500, 105 S. E. 329 (1920).
'
3 2Mobley v. Faircloth, 174 Ga. 808, 164 S. E. 195 (1932) ; Preston v. Howell, 219
Iowa 230, 257 N. W. 415 (1934); Payne v. Ostrus, 50 F. (2d) 1039 (C. C. A. 8th,
1931) ; Dept. of Banking v. McMullen, 134 Neb. 338, 278 N. W. 551 (1938); Hughes
v. Reed, 46 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931).
133 Smith v. Lyle, 59 S. D. 534, 241 N. W. 512 (1932).
'
34 Cole v. Brandle, 127 N. J. Eq. 31, 11 A. (2d) 255 (1940).
'
35Bassett v. St. Albans Hotel Co., 47 Vt. 313 (1875).
1:36270 Ky. 772, 110 S. W. (2d) 1079 (1937).
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latest, when the bank closed, and the fraud statute of limitations was held
not to apply. In Link v. McLeod3 7 the directors had resolved to reimburse
the president for his losses in stock transactions, which he induced the direc-
tors to believe were conducted on the corporation's account. It was held that
the creditor's action accrued, not when the money was paid out, but on the
date of the resolution. In Tennessee the action is barred when the time runs
out against an action by the corporation itself.'38 Winston v. Gordom' 3 9
held, in a case involving careless disregard of duties and improvident loans,
that the cause accrued when the wrong was committed.
D. Conclusion
The majority rule that the statute of limitations does not start to run
against an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance at least until the
creditor has procured judgment is reasonably grounded in the view that a
cause of action should not be barred before complainant has the right to
sue. The reason disappears when the creditor is allowed to commence his
action even before his claim matures. By the weight of authority, how-
ever, the statute does not commence to run when judgment is procured
upon the primary obligation, nor even upon the return of execution, if the
facts constituting the fraud have not then been discovered. The action is
held to be within the general fraud statute of limitations and the creditor
has the benefit of the discovery rule.
The New York rule that the cause accrues at the date of the fraudulent
transfer may result in the barring of the action before the creditor knows
that the transfer has been made. The rule, nevertheless, has its advantages.
It eliminates from the case the question of fact as to when the fraud should
have been discovered and facilitates the disposition of the action upon a
motion. Furthermore the security of titles is better established and trans-
ferees may develop and improve their property without danger that a cred-
itor of the grantor will claim many years later that he had just then discovered
the fraud. The length of time during which the cause of action may be
maintained gives reason for belief that not many creditors will suffer loss
by expiration of the statutory period.
The New York rule is applied whether the fraudulent transferor is a
natural person or a corporation. If the transferor is a corporation, how-
ever, the creditor may base his action on corporation laws and recover al-
337194 Pa.' 566, 45 At. 340 (1900).
13 8Wallace v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 89 Tenn. 630, 15 S. W. 448 (1891).139115 Va. 899, 80 S. E. 756 (1914).
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though his action based on the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act is
barred. The statute of limitations does not begin to run until return of
execution against the corporation, since the courts have consistently held that
the term "creditor" in the corporation laws considered, means a judgment
creditor with execution returned unsatisfied. Such a construction postpones
the possibility of litigation for long periods. There may be justification in
the fact that the transfers are very often from the corporation to the officers
and directors themselves. In such event the transfer may in reality involve
nothing more than a change in the form in which the owner elects to have
the title held.
Corporation statutes give creditors a right of action against directors and
officers whose negligence or mismanagement has caused loss to the cor-
poration. Such wrongs are usually righted in actions brought by stockhold-
ers. The stockholder is limited to the time within which the corporation
itself could sue. The creditor of the corporation is subject to the same
limitation on the theory of Hastings v. Byllesby & Co.'40 There is this differ-
ence, however: the stockholder may sue when the wrong is done; the creditor
cannot sue until the return of his execution against the property of the
corporation
140293 N. Y. 404, 57 N. E. (2d) 733 (1944).
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